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Abstract

Shame aversion has been theorized to motivate aggression against the self or others as means of
down-regulating shame. Additionally, the direction of aggression may depend on tendencies to
attribute blame or causes internally or externally. Data from two separate samples were used to
examine shame aversion and its interaction with causal or blame attributions in relation to
aggression, controlling for shame-proneness, which is more commonly studied. Results indicated
that shame aversion was positively associated with verbal, relational, and passive-rational
aggression, as well as with ruminative retribution and non-suicidal self-injury, after accounting
for shame-proneness. Most noteworthy, a significant two-way interaction indicated that the
association between shame aversion and ruminative retribution (fantasizing about people getting
their comeuppance) was particularly strong at high levels of externalization of blame. Findings
therefore suggest that although shame-proneness may create situations in which shame
regulation strategies are necessary, aggressive fantasies may be used as a regulation strategy
when individuals have difficulty tolerating shame and blame others for their circumstances.
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Association between Shame Aversion and Ruminative Retribution:
Evidence for Moderation by Externalization of Blame and Control
While shame is a universal human experience, individuals differ in their subjective
perceptions of the emotion. Those who experience elevated shame aversion (Schoenleber &
Berenbaum, 2010) – perceptions of shame as an especially painful and intolerable emotion –
have been theorized to be motivated to engage in a variety of emotion regulation strategies as
efforts to avoid or reduce their shame (Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012). In their model of
shame regulation strategies, Schoenleber and Berenbaum (2012) proposed that one form of
shame regulation is aggression. Indeed, past theory suggests that shame can sometimes be
redirected into anger (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Velotti et al., 2014), and
research has demonstrated associations between shame and anger (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2000;
Tangney et al., 1992); for example, shaming events contribute to greater feelings of anger among
adolescents (Thomaes et al., 2011). This redirection purportedly alters the behavioral response of
the person feeling shame, causing behaviors that are more typically associated with anger, such
as self-destructive impulsive behavior (e.g., Peters et al., 2014; Cassiello-Robins et al., 2019).
Thus, a primary assertion of the Schoenleber and Berenbaum (2012) model of shame regulation
strategies was that shame aversion would be associated with aggression.
In particular, this model and prior evidence suggest that other-directed forms of
aggression may be used to regulate shame, including acts of physical, verbal, relational, and
passive-rational aggression, as well as ruminative retribution (i.e. dwelling on fantasies of others
getting their comeuppance). Past studies provide support for relationships between shame and
some of these other-directed forms of aggression. For instance, parents’ feelings of shame
contribute to anger and tendencies to engage in physically and verbally aggressive punishments
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toward their children (Scarnier et al., 2009), and shame is associated with verbal aggression
toward intimate partners (Harper et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2009). Additionally, in a small sample
of men experiencing incarceration, thematic analysis of qualitative interview data revealed that
shame was a prevalent emotion and contributed to fantasies of revenge and violence (Falcus &
Johnson, 2018). Similarly, in undergraduate samples, higher levels of self-reported shame were
strongly associated with self-reported anger rumination, including revenge-planning (Peters et
al., 2014; Peters & Geiger, 2016).
In sum, there are already studies indicating that trait-like propensities to experience
shame (i.e. shame-proneness; Lewis, 1971) are related to anger and aggression, and as such,
shame-proneness was not the focus of the present investigation. However, shame-proneness and
shame aversion are distinct concepts, and we are not aware of any study to date that has
examined shame aversion in relation to these other-directed forms of aggression (Schoenleber &
Berenbaum, 2012). As a propensity or readiness to experience shame, elevations in shameproneness suggest a greater frequency of shame experiences across situations. By contrast,
shame aversion is an attitude about or dispositional reaction to actual or anticipated shame;
elevations in shame aversion suggest a desire to avoid the experience of shame. Moreover, to the
degree that shame aversion motivates behaviors that successfully (if sometimes maladaptively)
reduce shame, the association between shame aversion and shame-proneness may be weakened.
Ultimately, while the existing research suggests that shame-proneness may create opportunities
to use aggression to down-regulate shame, shame aversion may provide the motivation to
actually do so. Thus, the first aim of the present study was to examine the association between
shame aversion and the other-directed forms of aggression that may function as shame regulation
strategies. A second important aim was to consider whether shame aversion would continue to
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be relevant to aggression when accounting for shame-proneness. In other words, does the
possible motivating role of shame aversion increase the likelihood of engaging in aggression,
over and above general tendencies to feel shame often?
Importantly, the relationship between shame aversion and other-directed aggression may
be influenced by an individual’s tendency to externalize blame or causally attribute outcomes to
other people or the world, rather than to themselves or their own actions. Specifically, it may be
that higher levels of externalization of blame would facilitate a stronger relationship between
shame aversion and aggressive tendencies. Indeed, greater externalization of blame is associated
with anger in response to ambiguous scenarios (Neumann, 2000), and with aggression towards
intimate partners (Dutton & Starzomski, 1997; Scott & Straus, 2007). Of particular relevance,
across four diverse samples of adolescents and adults, higher shame-proneness was associated
with higher externalization of blame, which was subsequently associated with greater physical
and verbal aggression (Stuewig et al., 2010). No study yet has examined the interaction between
shame aversion and externalization of blame, however, despite the shame regulation model
suggesting that externalization of blame may moderate the association between shame aversion
and the use of aggression strategies. Importantly, although existing studies have assumed that
externalization of blame is a mediator and examined why shame-proneness leads to aggression,
we did not share that assumption in the case of shame aversion. Rather, we hypothesize that
shame aversion is why people engage in a wide variety of behaviors that could reduce the
probability, intensity, and/or duration of shame. From our perspective, externalization of blame
influences how likely it is that aggression will be among the behaviors chosen because it
involves identifying an external target at which the person can direct some of their behavioral
response. In other words, we expected that shame aversion would be associated with aggression
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and that externalization of blame would influence the strength of that association. Therefore, a
third aim of the present study was to examine the possible moderating role of externalization in
the potential association between shame aversion and aggression.
In addition to other-directed aggression, Schoenleber and Berenbaum (2012) theorized
that some self-directed aggressive behavior also functions as a shame regulation strategy,
hypothesizing that shame aversion would also be associated with non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI).
A recent meta-analysis revealed relationships for shame with NSSI history (i.e. presence vs.
absence) and frequency that were medium-to-large in effect size (Sheehy et al., 2019). As yet,
one study to date has examined shame aversion in relation to NSSI, finding that women with a
history of NSSI reported higher levels of shame aversion than women with no such history
(Schoenleber et al., 2014). However, shame aversion was not significantly associated with the
frequency of NSSI. In contrast to other-directed aggression, externalization of blame is not
expected to moderate the association between shame aversion and NSSI. Given the self-directed
nature of the behavior and its potential self-punitive function (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007), the
association between shame aversion and NSSI may depend on tendencies to internalize
responsibility for outcomes. Thus, a final aim of the present study was to examine the
relationship between shame aversion and NSSI in a new sample, as well as to account for shameproneness and examine internal locus of control as a potential moderator.
In summary, we had four hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that shame aversion would
be positively associated with other-directed physical, verbal, relational, and passive-rational
aggression, as well as ruminative retribution and self-directed NSSI. Although not a focus of the
present study, we also examined the associations of shame-proneness to aggressive acts. Second,
we hypothesized that these associations would remain important even when taking shame-
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proneness into account. Third, we hypothesized that externalization of blame or control would
moderate associations between shame aversion and other-directed forms of aggression after
accounting for shame-proneness. Fourth, we hypothesized that internal locus of control would
moderate the association between shame aversion and self-directed forms of aggression after
accounting for shame-proneness. Drawing from existing datasets from larger research projects
that were designed for other purposes, we tested these hypotheses in two samples. We tested all
of the above hypotheses related to other-directed aggression in one sample and all of the above
hypotheses for physical aggression, ruminative retribution, and NSSI in a second sample.
Method
Participants
Sample 1. A total of 213 undergraduates were recruited from a Midwestern liberal arts
college to participate in a larger project focused on differential associations of emotional
dispositions to genuine and egoistic forms of altruism. Data from two participants were
excluded due to missing responses on our measures of interest. The final sample of 211
participants had a mean age of 19.6 years (SD = 1.8) and was 74.2% cisgender female, 24.4%
cisgender male, and 1.4% reporting transgender male or “other.” Consistent with the broader
composition of the institution, the sample was primarily White (91.5%), followed by 2.4%
bi/multiracial, 1.9% Hispanic, 1.9% Asian/Pacific Islander, 0.9% Native American, 0.9%
African American, and 0.5% reporting “other.”
Sample 2. A community-based sample of 375 participants was recruited for a larger
research project aimed at understanding affective factors related to suicidal thoughts and
behaviors in an adult U.S. community sample using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Data
were excluded for five participants who were missing responses on our measures of interest. The
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final sample of 370 participants was 55.1% female (44.6% male, 0.3% “other”) and had a mean
age of 36.2 years (SD = 10.6). The majority were White (75.1%), along with 10.0%
Asian/Pacific Islander, 8.1% African American, 5.4% Hispanic, 0.5% Native American, and
0.8% reporting as “Other.” Half of the sample had obtained a college degree or higher (50.6%),
and 79.2% were employed at least part-time.
Measures
Shame Aversion. In both samples, the tendency to perceive of shame as an especially
unbearable emotion was assess using the Shame-Aversive Reactions Questionnaire (ShARQ;
Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2010). The ShARQ includes 14 items (7 reverse-scored), such as
“The most painful experience for me is when I recognize my own defects.” All items are rated
on a 7-point scale of agreement, producing a mean score between 1 and 7. Consistent with past
research, the ShARQ had strong internal consistency (ωs = .87 and .93 in Samples 1 and 2,
respectively), and the measure has also demonstrated good convergent validity in past work (e.g.,
Currie et al., 2017; Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2010; 2012).
Externalization of Blame/Locus of Control. In Sample 1 and Sample 2, we assessed
tendencies to blame others and/or circumstances for outcomes using the externalization of blame
subscale from the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney et al., 2000). The
TOSCA-3 is a scenario-based measure, presenting participants with 16 situations (e.g., “While
out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there”) and asking how likely it
is that they would exhibit a response that externalizes blame (e.g., “You would think that perhaps
that friend should have been there to defend him/herself.”) on a 1 to 5 scale, producing a mean
score between 1 and 5. This subscale demonstrated good reliability and validity in prior samples
(e.g., Tangney et al., 1992) and good internal consistency in the present study in Sample 1 (ω =
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.79) and Sample 2 (ω = .89).
In Sample 2, we additionally assessed internal and external locus of control using the
Multidimensional Locus of Control Inventory (MLCI; Levenson, 1973). The MLCI includes 24
items, eight of which comprise an internal subscale (ω = .87; e.g., “Whether or not I get to be a
leader depends mostly on my ability.”). An additional 16 items comprise the powerful others
(e.g., “My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others”) and chance (e.g., “To a great extent my
life is controlled by accidental happenings”) subscales, which were combined to create a broader
external locus of control score in this study (ω = .93), as the two original subscales were strongly
correlated (r = .76) and both reflect beliefs that causes of outcomes are external to the self. All
items were rated on a 6-point scale, producing mean scores between 1 and 6. The MLCI has been
used in numerous past studies.
Shame-Proneness. In both samples, propensities to experience shame across various
situations was assessed using the TOSCA-3 (Tangney et al., 2000) shame-proneness subscale.
For each of the 16 scenarios such as the one mentioned above (“While out with a group of
friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there”) participants also indicated how likely it was
that they would have a shame response (“You would feel small…like a rat.”). Internal
consistency was good in the present samples (ωs = .81 and .91), with past research supporting
the reliability and validity of the measure (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992). For the purpose of
reviewer-requested supplemental analyses, guilt-proneness scores on the TOSCA-3 were also
computed; internal consistency for the guilt-proneness subscale was ω = .81 in Sample 1 and ω =
.93 in Sample 2. Results are presented in Supplemental Tables 1-3.
Other-Directed Acts of Aggression. In Sample 1, participants completed a shortened
version of the Forms of Aggression measure (FOA; Verona et al., 2008) to assess physical,
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verbal, relational, and passive-rational forms of aggression. Specifically, this version generally
retained the four items on each subscale with the highest factor loadings in the original paper
(Verona et al., 2008). The exception was on the passive-rational subscale; for the shortened
version of the FOA, the two “passive” items with the highest loadings and the two “rational”
items with the highest loadings were retained. The shortened FOA asks participants about what
they do when they are upset or angry with others, including engaging in physical aggression
(e.g., “I beat them up”), verbal aggression (ω = .80; e.g., “I curse them out”), relational
aggression (ω = .83; e.g., “I ruin their friendships with other people”), and passive-rational
aggression (ω = .76; e.g., “I take my time doing things they want me to do, just to show them”).
The aggression against property subscale from the original FOA was not used in this study, as
Schoenleber and Berenbaum (2012) did not include it in their shame regulation strategies model.
All items were rated on a 5-point scale of frequency, producing sum scores from 4 to 20. Past
work using the original FOA demonstrates its convergent validity and reliability (e.g., Verona et
al., 2008; Schoenleber et al., 2011). Unfortunately, however, the physical aggression subscale
suffered from poor variability in the present sample; at least 98% of participants responded in the
same way (i.e. rating the individual items as “1 Almost never”) on each of the items on that
subscale. In fact, it was not possible to compute a value for ω for this subscale. The
interpretability of results when using the physical aggression subscale is therefore highly
questionable; as such, results for the physical aggression subscale are only reported in our
Supplemental Material (see Supplemental Tables 4-5), for the sake of comprehensiveness and
test all of our theory-driven hypotheses.
Because other-directed aggression was not a focus of the larger project from which we
drew Sample 2, physical aggression could only be assessed using the single item: “Have you
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been in physical fights?” from the Painful & Provocative Events Scale (Bender et al., 2011). The
item was rated on a 5-point scale labeled as never, once, 2-3 times, 4-20 times, and 20+ times. In
Sample 2, 41.9% of participants selected never, with 14.9% once, 28.1% 2-3 times, 13.5% 4-20
times, and 1.6% 20+ times. Verbal, relational, and passive-rational aggression were not assessed
in Sample 2.
Ruminative Retribution. Tendencies to dwell on others getting their comeuppance were
assessed using the thoughts of revenge subscale on the Anger Rumination Scale (ARS;
Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) in Sample 2 and the child version of this measure (C-ARS; Smith et
al., 2016) in Sample 1. The two measures each contain 19 items, rated on a 4-point scale of
frequency, producing mean scores from 1 to 4. While all items on each measure assess the same
content, the child version simplifies the phrasing of 10 items and improves readability. Although
the measure includes four subscales, only the four items comprising the thoughts of revenge
subscale (ω = .69 and α = .89; e.g., “When someone makes me angry, I can’t stop thinking about
how to get back at this person”) were of interest in the present study. Past research using the
ARS and C-ARS also demonstrates their reliability and associations with relevant correlates
(e.g., Peters et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2016; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001).
NSSI Frequency. The self-report form of the Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behaviors
Interview (SITBI; Nock et al., 2007) was used to assess for the history (i.e. presence vs. absence)
of NSSI, as well as frequency of NSSI among those with a history of such behavior.
Specifically, the SITBI asks “Have you ever actually engaged in NSSI?” and “How many times
in your life have you engaged in NSSI?” The SITBI has shown good test-retest reliability and
construct validity (Nock et al., 2007) and has been widely used in various samples (e.g., Stanley
et al., 2017; Stewart et al., 2015). In Sample 2, we also examined the responses of 94 participants
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(25.1%) who reported a history of NSSI, ranging from 1 lifetime act (3.2% of participants with
an NSSI history) to 5,000 (2.1%). Data from one additional participant reporting 10,000 lifetime
acts was not included in analyses. The mean frequency of NSSI was 236.2 (SD = 800.6), with a
median frequency of 20 acts of NSSI. As is often the case with count NSSI data, however, the
skew (5.0) and the kurtosis (26.5) of the distribution were both very high, and the data were
overdispersed.
Results
To test our first hypothesis – that shame aversion would be associated with the proposed
aggression shame regulation strategies – we began by examining the correlations between shame
aversion and these outcomes. Because NSSI frequency is a count variable, Spearman rank
correlations were used when examining that outcome in the subsample of individuals that had a
history of NSSI. For the sake of comprehensiveness, we additionally examined the associations
of shame-proneness, as well as externalization of blame and locus of control, to these aggression
outcomes. Because of the larger number of overall tests in the present study, we have opted to
focus on measures of effect size (e.g., r, f2, odds ratios), rather than relying solely or primarily on
p-values.
As shown in Table 1, shame aversion was positively associated with all forms of
aggression in Sample 1, with small-to-medium effect sizes (based on Cohen, 1992). In Sample
2, shame aversion demonstrated a large-sized association with ruminative retribution but was not
particularly related to either physical aggression or NSSI frequency. In contrast, shameproneness demonstrated positive small-sized effects with only verbal and passive-rational
aggression in Sample 1, as well as a positive small effect with NSSI frequency and a positive
medium effect with ruminative retribution in Sample 2. With regards to our moderator variables,

SHAME, BLAME, & AGGRESSION

13

in Sample 1 externalization of blame demonstrated positive relationships to aggression. In
Sample 2, externalization of blame showed only small-sized effects in relation to physical
aggression and NSSI frequency. By comparison, both externalization of blame and external
locus of control demonstrated positive medium-sized effects in relation to ruminative retribution.
Additionally, internal locus of control demonstrated negative small-sized effects in relation to
ruminative retribution and, unexpectedly, NSSI frequency.
To test our second and third hypotheses – that the association between shame aversion
and these outcomes would hold even when accounting for shame-proneness, and that
externalization of blame/external locus of control would moderate the association between
shame aversion and other-directed aggression – we next ran a series of hierarchical multiple
regressions. All independent variables were mean-centered prior to analysis. Predicting each of
the other-directed aggression outcomes individually in separate analyses, we entered shameproneness in Step 1. Shame aversion and externalization of blame/external locus of control were
entered simultaneously in Step 2, followed by the two-way interaction between these variables in
Step 3.
In Sample 1 (top portion of Table 2), shame aversion remained associated with all forms
of other-directed aggression after taking shame-proneness into account, with all associations
being small in size. Similarly in Step 2, externalization of blame demonstrated small-sized
effects with all forms of other-directed aggression. However, externalization of blame only
moderated the association between shame aversion and ruminative retribution in Step 3. As
shown in Figure 1, post-hoc simple slopes analyses with estimates at +1 SD and -1 SD (Aiken &
West, 1991) revealed that the relationship between shame aversion and ruminative retribution
was stronger at higher levels of externalization of blame (β = .21, p < .001, f2 = .11), versus at
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lower levels of externalization of blame (β = .08, p =.055, f2 = .018).
These results were broadly replicated in Sample 2 (bottom portion of Table 2) when
examining externalization of blame and external locus of control as moderators of shame
aversion’s associations with aggression outcomes. Shame aversion was not associated with
physical aggression, but demonstrated a medium-sized positive association with ruminative
retribution even after accounting for shame-proneness. Additionally, both externalization of
blame and external locus of control demonstrated small associations with ruminative retribution.
In Sample 2, there was little evidence of moderation by externalization of blame or external
locus of control; although it met traditional criteria for statistical significance, the interaction
between shame aversion and external locus of control was rather small in size (f2 = .012). A
figure depicting this interaction is available in the Supplemental Materials (see Supplemental
Figure 1).
Finally, to test our fourth hypothesis – that internal locus of control would moderate the
association between shame aversion and NSSI – we ran a negative binomial regression
predicting NSSI frequency (an overdispersed count variable), entering shame-proneness, shame
aversion, internal locus of control, and the shame aversion x internal locus of control interaction
simultaneously in the analysis (left portion of Table 3). Interestingly, while shame-proneness
was positively related to NSSI frequency, shame aversion and internal locus of control were both
negatively related to NSSI frequency, contrary to expectations. Additionally, the interaction
term had an Odds Ratio of 2.16, with post-hoc simple slopes analyses indicating that shame
aversion was not associated with NSSI frequency when internal locus of control was high (β =
.27, p = .12, OR = 1.31), but shame aversion was significantly negatively associated with NSSI
frequency when internal locus of control was low (β = -1.28, p < .001, OR = .28).
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In the interest of understanding whether externalization of blame or external locus of
control played any role in NSSI frequency, we additionally ran two exploratory post-hoc
negative binomial regression analyses. Specifically, we replaced internal locus of control with
externalization of blame and then with external locus of control in separate analyses to parallel
the analyses we had run for all our other-directed aggression outcomes. As would be expected
based on theory, results (right portions of Table 3) indicated that neither externalization of blame
nor external locus of control were associated with NSSI frequency. However, the interaction
terms were again noteworthy. For externalization of blame, shame aversion was negatively
associated with NSSI frequency when externalization of blame was high (β = -1.44, p < .001, OR
= .24) but positively associated with NSSI frequency when externalization of blame was low (β
= .66, p = .04, OR = 1.93). Somewhat similarly for external locus of control, shame aversion
was negatively associated with NSSI frequency when external locus of control was high (β = .91, p < .001, OR = .40) but not associated with NSSI frequency when external locus of control
was low (β = .29, p = .14, OR = 1.33).
Discussion
This study provides the first support for the role of shame aversion in relation to
aggressive tendencies. We found that shame aversion demonstrated small-to-medium sized
effects in relation to various forms of other-directed aggression, including verbal, relational, and
passive-rational aggression, as well as ruminative retribution. Importantly, these relationships
persisted even after accounting for shame-proneness, a construct previously shown to be
associated with aggression in past research (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992; Thomaes et al., 2011).
However, we only found support for our moderation hypotheses in relation to ruminative
retribution, which also demonstrated the strongest association with shame aversion. Overall, a
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possible interpretation of these findings is that while a greater propensity for shame increases
opportunities for a person to regulate that emotion through aggression, a greater intolerance for
shame may influence the likelihood of using aggression as an emotion regulation strategy when
feelings of shame arise. Of course, future research using within-person methods is necessary to
examine this possibility more closely.
Our results regarding ruminative retribution are particularly interesting, and it is
especially noteworthy that these results were similar across two very different samples.
Consistent with the idea that externalization of blame would moderate how much shame aversion
would be associated with aggressive acts (Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012), we found a
significant interaction between shame aversion and externalization of blame in relation to
ruminative retribution in Sample 1. Specifically, shame aversion was associated with persistent
thoughts of revenge against others, but we found that this was especially true for individuals with
a tendency to blame others for unwanted outcomes. Interestingly, this interaction did not
replicate in Sample 2 when using externalization of blame as the moderator; however, the
interaction between shame aversion and external locus of control in Sample 2 was similar to that
found in Sample 1, except the size of the effect was quite small. Ultimately, additional research
further examining the moderating role of externalization of blame and external locus of control is
necessary. Indeed, given that externalization of blame and external locus of control are not
synonymous constructs, additional work may help to clarify whether either or both constructs
influence the association between shame and aggressive tendencies. Additionally, contrary to
our hypothesis, this interaction was not found for other forms of aggression, such as verbal or
relational aggression against others.
Why might externalization of blame or external locus of control particularly influence the
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relationship between shame aversion and ruminative retribution? One possible reason may have
to do with an important difference between ruminative retribution and the other forms of otherdirected aggression; ruminative retribution does not require real actions against another person.
Ruminative retribution is an intrapsychic cognitive process, an explicit focusing of one’s
thoughts onto revenge and comeuppance. By comparison, all of the other forms of otherdirected aggression involve overt actions taken against someone else. Even if a person is both
shame averse and externalizes blame onto others or causally attributes outcomes externally, there
may be other factors that counteract engagement in interpersonal acts of aggression. Therefore, it
remains an open question what other factors may influence the likelihood of engaging in otherdirected aggressive acts when experiencing painful shame. One possible relevant factor is
inhibition; whereas ruminative retribution inherently involves stopping to think about who and
what is making you feel ashamed and angry, the other forms of other-directed aggression may
not require – or may even be hindered by – devoting time to thought before acting.
Future research could also consider the downstream maladaptive effects of ruminative
retribution. Despite perhaps presenting fewer immediate interpersonal risks, ruminative
retribution may still have damaging social consequences. Perseverating on revenge against others
may make it difficult for individuals to be friendly and open when meeting new people or to
establish trust in relationships. Ruminative retribution may also contribute to a sense of
inefficacy or chronic frustration and irritability over time, as the person’s thoughts of revenge
may never come to fruition. These possibilities are consistent with past research on anger
rumination – of which ruminative retribution is one component – demonstrating causal links to
heightened anger and interpersonal aggression (Bushman et al., 2005; Peled & Moretti, 2010), as
well as associations with greater mood instability and difficulties in relationships (Peters et al.,
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2014).
Results regarding self-directed aggression in the form of NSSI were largely contrary to
our hypotheses and are more complicated to interpret. Overall, our results demonstrate
reciprocal suppressor effects (see Conger, 1974). Shame-proneness, shame aversion, and locus
of control were unrelated to NSSI in our Spearman rank correlations. However, including these
variables in a single analysis increased the strength of their associations with NSSI frequency,
with the exception of externalization. Suppressor effects should be interpreted with good deal of
caution, especially prior to replication. If replicable, suppressor effects may indicate the
appropriate removal of irrelevant variance from correlated predictor variables, thereby improving
the ability of each variable to predict the outcome (Pandey & Elliott, 2010). However, there
would also need to be theory-informed reasons for expecting a suppressor effect. For instance,
Paulhus et al. (2004) have demonstrated replicable reciprocal suppression between shame and
guilt, which is consistent with theories regarding these self-conscious emotions.
With regard to our results, the strong correlation between shame-proneness and shame
aversion, in particular, is theoretically unsurprising. Individuals who tend to experience shame
more readily may also have greater awareness of how painful that emotion can be. Moreover,
although individuals who are shame averse may put more effort into avoiding shame-eliciting
situations, the strategies used to preventatively down-regulate shame may themselves be
maladaptive and cause a rebound or increase in shame (see Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012).
By including both variables in a single analysis, we may be accounting for this complex
reciprocal relationship, allowing the remaining variance in both shame-proneness and shame
aversion to demonstrate meaningful relationships with NSSI. In this case, and consistent with
past research (e.g., Schoenleber et al., 2014; Sheehy et al., 2019), greater propensities to
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experience shame were associated with greater NSSI. The negative association between shame
aversion and NSSI frequency requires more thought, as we had originally hypothesized a
positive relationship, based on existing theories. However, it may be that in addition to being
aware of how painful shame is, people may also be aware of how likely it is that engaging in
NSSI will ultimately elicit more shame. If so, then as we found, shame aversion would deter
individuals from engaging in NSSI. Moreover, the noteworthy interaction term suggests this
association is conditioned on levels of internal or external locus of control/externalization of
blame. Indeed, some NSSI theories suggest that the behavior serves a self-punishing function
(Linehan, 1993). If a person does not tend to view themselves as the cause of an unwanted
outcome, there may be little reason to respond with a self-punishing behavior, even if the person
has a dispositional intolerance for shame. All that said, future work is imperative, and these
interpretations are highly speculative. The suppressor effects require replication, and additional
studies are needed to more effectively examine this possible interpretation.
Some additional results were inconsistent with hypotheses. First, internal locus of control
demonstrated unexpected relationships with other variables more broadly in this study. For
example, shame is the tendency to blame the self for unpleasant outcomes, and as such it is
reasonable to expect that internal locus of control may be positively related to a propensity to
engage in this kind of self-blame across a variety of situations (i.e. shame-proneness). Yet we
found a negative association between shame-proneness and internal locus of control. With this
in mind, as well as the issue of suppressor effects discussed above, it may be premature to
interpret the results of our internal locus of control analysis. However, it is worth noting that the
interaction between internal locus of control and shame aversion remains significant even when
shame-proneness is not included in the analysis. Future work examining internal locus of control
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in relation to shame and NSSI may also benefit from the use of different measures of locus of
control, specifically by choosing a measure that produces separate scores for perceptions of
control over positive and negative events or outcomes; individuals high on shame-proneness, for
example, may tend to attribute negative outcomes internally while not attributing positive
outcomes internally. Second, although the shame regulation model (Schoenleber & Berenbaum,
2012) explicitly predicted that externalization of blame would not be relevant to NSSI, we found
a significant interaction between shame aversion and externalization of blame, as well as
between shame aversion and external locus of control. Of course, these results occurred in the
context of suppressor effects and should therefore be interpreted with caution. To the extent that
they may be replicable, our results indicated that NSSI was less frequent when shame aversion
and externalization of blame or control were both high; in other words, perceiving of shame as
intolerable and tending to attribute unwanted outcomes to external factors was associated with
less engagement in self-directed aggression. Given that high shame aversion and externalization
of blame/external locus of control also was linked to greater retributive rumination, perhaps this
combination of factors contributes to aggressive emotion regulation strategies focused on others
rather than the self.
The present study had some additional limitations that suggest other directions for future
research. First, in both samples, we relied on self-report measures even though we were
assessing behaviors that might be considered socially undesirable – other-directed aggression
and NSSI. Although we hope that the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants’
responses allowed them to provide honest assessments of their engagement in these behaviors,
we recognize that participants may hesitate to report all instances of these behaviors. This may
especially be true for individuals who are shame-prone and may consider these behaviors to be
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shameful. Use of informant-reports, particularly for the overt other-directed forms of aggression,
would be beneficial in future studies, as would tasks or measures that more directly assess
engagement in aggressive acts. Moreover, self-report measures can suffer from memory
mistakes; the retrospective reporting of how often participants engaged in aggressive acts or
NSSI may be somewhat inaccurate. Daily diary studies or experimental designs that use shame
inductions may be helpful for further understanding how shame aversion may motivate
engagement in aggression and NSSI. Such designs would also allow for examination causal
effects, which could not be examined in the present study despite the shame regulation model
and our hypotheses suggesting causality. That our two samples were drawn from larger projects
with different goals from one another – and different aims than the present study – also created
notable limitations; specifically, an interest in examining the association between shame aversion
and aggression, as well as the moderating roles of externalization of blame/external locus of
control/internal locus of control, was developed after data collection for both projects had been
completed. These circumstances prevented us from choosing measures specific to the needs of
our hypotheses or from administering the same measures to both samples. Future investigations
designed to specifically address the hypotheses presented herein may benefit from the use of
different measures, such as those that assess to whom/what people attribute their experiences of
shame. It may also be worthwhile to consider whether externalization of blame/external locus of
control specifically moderate the association between shame aversion and aggressive tendencies,
as opposed to aversions to guilt (a related but distinct self-conscious emotion) or more general
fears of emotional experience. Finally, it is important to note that the ability to test our
hypotheses in relation to physical aggression was limited in Sample 1 by a lack of variability in
participants’ reported levels of physical aggression; although we provide our results in our
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supplemental materials, they cannot be interpreted with any real confidence. Future studies will
be necessary to look more closely at the roles of shame aversion and externalization of blame/
external locus of control in relation to physical aggression.
In conclusion, although the present findings require replication in additional samples, the
present paper is the first to provide some support for the assertions regarding aggression
strategies described in the shame regulation model. In particular, results provided some support
for the assertion that externalization of blame/external locus of control would moderate the
relationship between shame aversion and ruminative retribution. The expectation of moderation
was not met for the remaining forms of other-directed aggression, though shame aversion was
associated with verbal, relational, and passive-rational aggression over and above shameproneness. Taken all together, these initial results highlight the need for further investigations
into how shame aversion may motivate engagement in aggressive acts as a means of downregulating shame.
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